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the world do not actually want further democratisation but
a continuation of exploitative capitalism and political ar-
bitration in all spheres of life.
The divisions in the Croatian public and govern-
ment about this question and others, on which the interna-
tional position ofthe country depends, has brought Croatia
closer than ever to sanctions. All this means that those of us
who are involved in the Croatian diplomatic effort have to
attempt the difficult task of reconciling these obvious op-
positions in the interests of the state and for the good of its
citizens.
There are elements oftruth in both approaches, but
morally and in all soberness one's predilection must be
against any Croatian autism. At the international level
Croatia has to maximise its effects, and inside the country
has to channel domestic differences through the demo-
cratic institutions of the political system. International
surveillance, observation and interference are not always
pleasant, and sometimes are degrading. Our attitude to
them however cannot be a clumsy threshing around. The
main reason the international community, through the
OSCE Mission, is interfering more and more critically and
in detail in the public and political life of Croatia is in the
growing mutual distrust that is the result of the opposing
viewpoints already mentioned in the public and the gov-
ernment, viewpoints that clash in an unproductive way.
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There is not such a great problem in the formulations of
procedures and other documents and instructions that the
Croatian government accepts, rather in the distrust shown
by the international community with respect to Croatia's
most recent intentions. Croatia sometimes takes on inter-
national commitments too lightly, and then does not carry
them out to the letter, reducing its international credibil-
ity. This situation is made use of by countries and services
that via their network in Croatia would like to further their
own particular interests, equating the historical guilt of
Serbia and Croatia. We must not help assist them in this.
The solution, then, lies in restoring mutual trust
between Croatia and the international community. The only
way for the OSCE to stop laying down the law about our
television programmes, history text books or judicial pro-
cedures is to have the required official explanation be-
lieved in the world. Fewer and fewer observers will be
met in the field in Croatia, and more and more European
experts who will assist Croatian society in making its regu-
lations, standards and behaviour fit the standards and ex-
pectations of the developed world to which it both aspires
and belongs.
It is not up to the Croats to change the destiny of
the world, but, with their new state, the Croats have a
chance to change their own, making it a harmonious part




Societies tom by internal conflict are a com-
mon feature of the contemporary international land-
scape. Whether in Chechnya, Algeria, the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, or Sri Lanka, peoples in
many countries are fighting each other. While more
visible perhaps at the end of the cold war, divided
societies have been an international reality for years.
Roy Licklider has identifies 84 such wars between
1945 and 1990. These were of two general types:
wars fought over socio-economic and/or political
issues, e.g., Vietnam, Cuba and Haiti, and conflicts
on the basis of identity, e.g., Northern Ireland, the
former Yugoslavia, and Cyprus. This article will at-
tempt to make some generalizations about Ameri-
can policy in these diverse cases. First, it will look
to the past by reviewing. U.S. policy during the cold
war. Then, it will consider the Clinton adrninistra-
tion by examining its policies and the dilemmas
which have resulted.
A Brief Historical Review
The United States was involved in many in-
ternal conflicts in the years after 1945. It sent large
numbers of troops to Korea and Vietnam, provided
large amounts of assistance to embattled governments
in Greece, Taiwan, and El Salvador, and promoted
unrest in Cuba, Nicaragua, the Congo, and Chile. To
cite merely the most extensive and geographically
remote involvement, there were 550,000 American
troops in South Vietnam in 1968, despite the fact
that that country is literally halfway around the world
from Washington, D.C. While the U.S. employed
many tactics, the purpose of these initiatives was
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almost always the same, i.e., to see its friends win
the struggle against their opponents. There may have
been rhetoric about negotiated solutions and com-
promise, but the primary goal of American policy
was victory. consider its policy in the 1980s toward
two embattled societies in Central America: it sup-
ported the Salvadoran government against armed
insurgents and supported armed insurgents against
the Nicaraguan government.
The end of the cold war has had an ambigu-
ous impact upon both the number of divided societ-
ies and American policy in such cases. One conse-
quence of the demise of the Soviet Union was that
combatants could no longer rely upon Soviet assis-
tance, increasing their incentive to negotiate a com-
promise settlement. Such logic led to the resolution
or potential resolution of many conflicts, including
those in Central America and southern Africa. This
could argue for greater or lesser American attention
to the problem of divided societies. On the one hand,
the demise of the USSR increases the relative posi-
tion of the United States and the possibility of re-
solving such conflicts, because American leverage
might be enhanced by the desire of former combat-
ants for western economic assistance. On the other
hand, the cessation of the Soviet/communist threat
in places like Angola, Nicaragua, and elsewhere
could argue for reduced American attention, as it was
the Soviet threat which had dictated American in-
volvement in the first place. Another consequence
of the demise of police states in the USSR and else-
where has been an increase in the number of divided
societies. The emergence of new cases in places like
Chechnya or the former Yugoslavia could also argue
for greater or lesser U.S. attention. American involve-
ment might stretch its military, economic, and diplo-
matic resources too far, but the sheer increase in the
number of conflicts argues for American involve-
ment, because some undoubtedly might threaten
American interests.
The Clinton Administration
These ambiguities are reflected in the Clinton
administration's behaviour since 1993. It has worked
to resolve some conflicts but not others. Thus, it has
worked actively in Haiti, the former Yugoslavia,
Northern Ireland, and the Middle East. Yet it has done
little or nothing about conflicts in Sri Lanka, Alge-
ria, Zaire, or Rwanda. Before examining what the
administration has done, it is necessary to consider
why it has chosen to involve itself where it has.
Even at the height of the cold war the United
States was not involved in all divided societies. There
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are a number of new obstacles in the current era to
American intervention, however. One is American
public opinion. While not isolationist, the public is
now much more self-interested. In a recent poll, the
top five goals specified for the U.S. were to stop the
flow of illegal drugs into the U.S., protect the jobs
of American workers, prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons, control and reduce illegal immigration to
the United States, and secure adequate supplies of
energy. None of these relates directly to an Ameri-
can role in divided societies, although the immigra-
tion, nuclear weapons, and energy supplies goals
might be relevant to specific cases. The proposed
goals which received the least support in this poll
where those which do relate more clearly to an
American role in divided societies: protecting hu-
man rights, protecting countries against aggression,
promoting democracy, and helping to improve the
standard ofliving in less developed countries. Those
goals received less support in this poll than they had
in any similar poll of the preceding twenty years.
There is a particularly strong opposition to putting
American troops in danger. When Clinton proposed
air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions in early
1993, 55% of the public opposed. Even after the
Dayton Peace Agreement had been signed, the House
of Representatives opposed sending American troops
to that country, and the Senate gave grudging sup-
port only when it was clear that troops would be sent.
In the Haitian case, too, more than half the public
opposed sending troops.
The military has been very hesitant about send-
ing troops overseas since the Vietnam War. Its doubts
were reinforced by the experience in Somalia in the
early months of the Clinton presidency. Military
thinking is reflected in the 1995 National Security
Report, which distinguishes three types of situations
in which American troops might be used. According
to this report, the U.S. should do whatever is neces-
sary, including the unilateral use of force, when its
vital interests are threatened. In situations where
important but not vital interests are present, the use
of force should be limited and conditioned on issues
such as the likelihood of success, costs and risks
commensurate with American interests, and the fail-
ure of other means to achieve U.S. objectives. Where
only humanitarian interests are threatened, the use
of American combat forces is ruled out, since Ameri-
can forces should only be used to provide unique
services or meet urgent and otherwise unattainable
needs. Since divided societies will probably involve
U.S. interests of the latter two types only, the use of
American forces will be limited.
Despite these obstacles, the Clinton adminis-
tration has been quite active in seeking to resolve
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conflicts in Haiti, Bosnia, Northern Ireland, and the
Middle East. What factors have led it to become in-
volved in these situations?
Factors Encouraging Involvement
One important factor has been the opinion of
important domestic interest groups. While, as noted
earlier, the general public is often sceptical of an
American role in societies in conflict, there are some-
times significant domestic groups that advocate an
activist American role. It is not unusual for demo-
cratic governments to heed interest group demands
contrary to general opinion. In fact, public indiffer-
ence may actually increase presidential discretion.
The Haitian case provides an example. The general
public was not moved by Haitian events and opposed
the use of American forces to restore democracy in
that country, but African-Americans - a crucial com-
ponent of Clinton's constituency - overwhelmingly
endorsed such policies. Similarly, Jewish-Americans
have long advocated an active American role in the
Arab-Israeli dispute.
The best recent example of the power of in-
terest groups, however, is provided by the Northern
Ireland case. Clinton had said little about that em-
battled territory prior to the 1992 presidential pri-
mary in New York. There, he promised to appoint a
special envoy to Northern Ireland, to pressure the
British government about human rights violations in
the province, and to issue a visa for Sinn Fein leader
Gerry Adams - something the United States had re-
fused to do for 20 years. Later, during the fall cam-
paign, Clinton promised to take a more active role in
Northern Ireland's peace process and to work with
the British to reduce job discrimination against
Catholics. Whether for this reason or others, Irish-
Americans voted overwhelmingly for Clinton in
1992. In fact, without their support in New York,
California, and New England, Clinton would not
have won the presidency. Clinton understood the
importance of the Irish-American vote and realized
he would have to act upon the promises he had made.
That necessity continued throughout his first term,
since congressional Democrats needed the Irish-
American vote in the 1994 elections and Clinton,
himself, would need it in 1996.
The President's credibility is another factor
prompting American action. In addition to pledges
about Northern Ireland, Clinton had promised a more
activist U.S. role in Haiti and Bosnia in the 1992
campaign. Once he became president, his own cred-
ibility required that those promises be honoured,
because failure to do so would have reinforced the
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popular impression that he had no principles and
based his policy solely upon public opinion. Simi-
larly, he had promised to send American troops to
Bosnia in the aftermath of a peace settlement there.
When such a settlement came, he had little choice
but to do so, despite public opinion.
Domestic American politics is relevant in other
ways. Clinton had had a number of foreign policy
setbacks in his first year in office, including Soma-
lia, the changed position on the linkage of human
rights to most favoured trade status for China, and
the failure to persuade European allies of the wis-
dom of his proposed "lift and strike" policy for
Bosnia. Consequently, he needed a foreign policy
success. This, and the electoral calendar, may help
explain why the President decided in early 1994,
against the wishes of the State Department, to grant
a visa to Gerry Adams and why preparations were
being made in September 1994 to send troops to
Haiti. Similarly, the onset of the 1996 presidential
campaign may help explain why Clinton made the
December 1995 decision to send troops to Bosnia.
This depiction of the reasons for the active
American role in Haiti, Bosnia and elsewhere should
not be taken to mean that domestic politics, alone,
explain U.S. policy. If that were true, Clinton would
not have sent troops to Bosnia, even after the Day-
ton peace agreement. The President believed suffi-
cient American interests were present in each of these
cases to merit American involvement. All post-world
War II Presidents have recognized U.S. interests in
the Middle East and sought to reduce tensions be-
tween Israel and its neighbours, so Clinton's activ-
ism there breaks no precedents. His policies in Haiti,
Bosnia, and Northern Ireland are a break with the
past. George Bush, Clinton's predecessor, did not
believe the United States had a significant stake in
either Haiti or the Balkans. Clinton disagreed, be-
lieving American interests in Haiti included the pro-
motion of democracy in the Caribbean and stemming
the role of refugees to the United States. With re-
spect to the former Yugoslavia, Clinton argued that
American interests included the danger that war
might expand, the role and credibility of NATO in
the post-cold war era, assertion of the principle that
aggression should not stand, and the humanitarian
tragedy there.
There were also fortuitous developments that
increased the likelihood that these conflicts might
be solved. The Bosnian situation had changed dra-
matically by 1995: economic sanctions were having
an impact upon Serbia territorial boundaries between
the various communities in the country had become
more coincident with demographic boundaries,
NATO had demonstrated a willingness to strike at
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Bosnian Serb positions, and all were war-weary. The
September 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization created an
opportunity to resolve their conflict and both parties
sought an active American role. In Northern Ireland,
too, the situation was changed by the Downing Street
Declaration of December 1993, in which Britain
agreed to allow Sinn Fein to participate in negotia-
tions if it agreed to a cease-fire.
Dilemmas
While these four cases demonstrate the Clinton
administration's determination to work to resolve
selected conflicts, the policies adopted in the four
cases where very different. In Haiti, the U.S. pro-
vided strong rhetorical for exiled President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, pledged to send troops to restore
him to power, and engaged in last-minute negotia-
tions with the Haitian military to reach a settlement.
The U.S. never pledged to send troops to either the
Middle East or Northern Ireland but did engage in
active diplomacy in both cases. The Clinton admin-
istration was especially active in the Bosnian case,
where it worked with the Croatian and Muslim com-
munities in Bosnia to form a federation, exerted dip-
lomatic pressure to end the fighting, worked to have
NATO endorse the use of air strikes against Bosnian
Serbs, took an active role in the Dayton peace con-
ference, and sent troops to enforce the peace. One
thing that was common to American policy in all
these cases was the desire to resolve the conflict.
This marks a significant change from American
policy in the cold war period.
Only the Haitian case has been resolved to date
and that was largely a result of a threatened U.S.
invasion, an unlikely policy in any of the other cases
considered here. In those situations the United States
has sought to work with local parties to resolve the
conflict. As it has, several dilemmas have emerged.
An examination of these dilemmas sheds light on
the difficulties the Clinton administration has faced
and raises issued it will likely confront in the future.
Economics VS. Politics Dilemma
One common element in these cases was the provi-
sion of American economic assistance. Typically, the
u.S. gives funds after the conclusion of a peace settle-
ment. In the Middle East, for instance, so much as-
sistance has been provided to Israel and Egypt since
their 1979 peace agreement that those two countries
are now the leading recipients of American assis-
tance, receiving nearly 40% of the total. Similarly,
the U.S. pledged $500 million for the economic de-
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velopment of the West Bank and Gaza soon after the
1993 Israeli-PLO agreement. Others who have made
peace have also received American economic assis-
tance: Haiti received $l35 million in FY 1996 and
$120 million in FY 1997, and when the World Bank
concluded in 1995 that $96 billion would be needed
for reconstruction in Bosnia, the United States prom-
ised almost 10% of that total. The Northern Ireland
case is different only in the sense that assistance has
been provided prior to resolution of the conflict. The
U.S. has provided more than $265 million since pas-
sage of the Anglo-Irish Support Act in 1986. Clinton
has expanded American support, being the first Presi-
dent to approve American contributions to the Inter-
national Fund for Ireland. In addition to public re-
sources, the U.S. has sought to involve the private
sector in efforts to rebuild divided societies. It con-
cluded a free trade agreement with Israel in 1995
and later extended it to include the West Bank and
Gaza. The United States also worked with regional
governments and the private sector to establish a
Middle East Development Bank and a Middle East-
Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association.
Similarly, the U.S. sponsored conferences in 1995
and 1996 to encourage investment in Northern Ire-
land and has sent a number of trade missions there.
One of the purposes of this assistance, e.g. in
Bosnia, is physical reconstruction. More importantly,
however, the assistance is designed to improve the
quality of life for ordinary people, to give them a
stake in peace, and to try to alleviate the poverty,
which may have led to violence in the first place. As
former Secretary of State Christopher once argued,
there is a "critical link between peace and prosperity
in the Middle East" and elsewhere. Or, as Commerce
Secretary William Daley noted in October 1997,
"peace and stability can take hold and prosper only
in an environment of potential economic growth and
revitalization. "
No one would dispute these goals. However,
one can ask whether economic revitalization or po-
litical stability comes first. The United States, im-
plicitly, assumes the former. Many, however, espe-
cially in the private sector, would argue that politi-
cal stability precedes economic growth. As the State
Department has lamented with respect to Haiti, there
has been only a slow return of private investment
because "businesses have awaited the establishment
of stable political conditions and enhanced security".
In addition to this sequencing dilemma, one might
question the American assumption that mutual tol-
erance and understanding will result from economic
growth. Can economic growth mute the strong pas-
sions that follow a civil war? Will the contending
groups work together to distribute assistance or com-
f
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pete for the spoils, exacerbating political tension?
Are there likely to be disputes over the distribution
of reconstruction assistance or the basis on which
such funds are provided? Issues such as these may
help explain why Licklider discovered that negoti-
ated solutions to civil wars are less likely to be stable
than civil wars ended by victory of one side. Finally,
economic growth, itself, especially the rapid eco-
nomic growth which might follow the conclusion of
a civil war, can often be politically destabilizing,
since it widens the gap between rich and poor, cre-
ates new winners and losers, and creates gaps be-
tween political and economic power.
None of this is to argue that that United States
should not provide assistance to those who have made
peace. There are many needs which must be filled,
the U.S. has resources to aid in their fulfilment, and
the contention that political moderation and stabil-
ity require economic growth is undoubtedly correct.
There must be recognition, however, that conflict
resolution is essentially a political process. Economic
growth is undoubtedly a necessary condition for po-
litical stability, but it is not a sufficient condition.
Outcome VS. Process Dilemma
Another component of the American approach
has been to establish a negotiating process to allow
the parties, themselves, to negotiate their differences.
Thus, the United States actively supported the onset
of negotiations in the Bosnian and Northern Ireland
cases and was an active participation in both. While
surprised to learn of the Oslo Peace Agreement, the
United States became an active supporter after 1993.
The logic is that any political solution to such
longstanding conflicts will require time to negoti-
ate, that the parties will have to work out their own
differences, and that any settlement they do agree to
is more likely to endure.
Once negotiations have begun, there is pres-
sure on all parties to continue the process. It some-
times appears that the Clinton administration is con-
cerned more with keeping the negotiating process
alive in the Middle East and Northern Ireland than
with a final outcome. It makes ritualistic statements
of support and tries not to criticize the parties or to
criticize them equally. While negotiations did achieve
a breakthrough in the Bosnian case, the continued
stationing of American troops there demonstrates that
much more needs to be done and of the desire to
keep that process alive. There is good sense in all of
this. Ongoing negotiations keep the parties talking
rather than fighting as well as allowing momentum
for peace to develop. Moreover, continued negotia-
tions between Israelis and Palestinians or between
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Irish Catholics and Protestants serves the political
interests of President Clinton. He has claimed much
of the credit for bringing such groups together and
has supported their efforts strongly, so failure of a
negotiation would have an adverse impact upon his
foreign policy legacy.
Yet there are dangers with this emphasis on
process. Since the parties to a civil conflict may lack
the wisdom or political courage to negotiate a solu-
tion, the process might become interminable. Nego-
tiations between Israel and the Palestinians have been
going on for almost five years and much remains to
be done before a settlement is reached. The negotia-
tions in Belfast, similarly, have been largely fruit-
less despite years of negotiations. A process without
a final settlement contains a number of risks, includ-
ing the dashing of heightened expectations and the
belief of the participants that there is no alternative
to violence.
All this argues for a more assertive American
role, especially when negotiations have stalled. If the
parties are unable to reach a settlement, the United
States may have to consider inserting its own pre-
ferred outcome. This is something it rarely does,
again for good reason. Announcing America's pre-
ferred outcome entails risks: it will likely offend one
or both parties to the negotiations and cannot be
imposed by the United States in any event. Yet
American assertiveness may be the key to breaking
a deadlock in negotiations.
American officials would be wise to consider
these dilemmas. While there is no easy solution for
either, the United States may have to consider a more
assertive and explicitly political approach if peace
is to come to Bosnia, Northern Ireland, or the Middle
East. Moreover, since experience in the cold war and
post-cold war eras demonstrates that many countries
will be challenged by internal political divisions and
that the United State will attempt to resolve some of
those conflicts, consideration of these issues now will
aid its future efforts. •
